Yet the canal project is about far more than these two parties. The delay in completion threatens to play havoc with a vast number of interest groups that rely on the waterway for their business operations.

Shipping companies have invested heavily on new vessels, and ports have sunk billions of dollars into upgrades. U.S. energy companies are positioning themselves to use the canal to transport their surfeit of liquified natural gas to places, such as Asian countries, that will pay premium prices. States such as Texas have launched initiatives to prepare the transportation infrastructure for the expected boom in trade. All these efforts are counting on the 2015 target date for the opening of the canal's third lane.

Thus far, the only outside pressure on the involved parties has been from Spanish and Panamanian governmental officials who have urged the two sides to meet, then stepped aside. If the standoff continues and the division between the ACP and GUPC seems to worsen, more groups invested in the project's completion likely will make their concerns known.

At a certain point, the ACP's reluctance to pay for, outside of the arbitration system, the claimed overruns has to be weighed against the cost of pushing back the project's completion. Similarly, GUPC cannot expect to have the owner meet all the cost claims without expecting assurances in return.

The sheer importance of the canal project to the rest of the world suggests the impulse to place blame and assign financial culpability must be set aside to allow a practical working solution to the crisis to emerge. The lesson of de Lesseps' legacy suggests the alternative is far too perilous to allow to come to pass.