Killed in the accident were Felix Jose Lopez, 42; Felipe Mendez, 25; and Reginald Magee, 41. Lopez and Mendez were pronounced dead at the scene. Magee later died from his injuries at a local hospital. Two other workers injured in the accident were treated and are expected to make a full recovery, authorities said. 

An announcement of the report sent by company President Craig Albert and Bechtel Energy unit President Paul Marsden circulated internally on Oct. 7 and was posted on the Bechtel website on Oct. 8.  The report summary says that the five-member crew included relative site newcomers who lacked enough training on the formwork jumping system.

Although the three workers who died had been given fall protection training, they "appeared not to have their fall arrest lanyards" tied to "an approved anchorage point," the Bechtel executives say. The company also failed to mentor the new hires in a buddy-system as required by its own policy, they add. 

"One of the most important takeaways from our review is the role that safety culture played—and, in some cases, failed to play," say Albert and Marsden. "In reviewing the incident, we found breakdowns in oversight and supervision—where moments to step in and take corrective action were missed." 

The executives further emphasize the need to "strengthen the proactive identification of life-critical risks by work crews and front-line supervisors during daily work planning" as well as need for "strict adherence to life-critical safety processes by encouraging real-time, peer-to-peer interventions—prompting crews to pause and reset, seek necessary input, and correct unsafe conditions."

New Bechtel Rules

New safety measures will be applied to formwork jumping and all work at heights, the note further states.

Under its new rules, Bechtel will triple-verify that bracket connections are properly made prior to jumping concrete formwork, according to Albert and Marsden. They say an improperly made connection triggered the sudden loss of support and tilting of the work platform in the Texas project's formwork.

But a key part of the company's revelations involve staff training and company culture that appeared to come up short.

The company says it will also assure that temporary work platforms are managed in the same manner as traditional scaffolding and add site workforce manager level training, safety staff supervision and clarified procedures on tie-offs to existing safety protocols.

The accident involved relatively recent hires working late at night who had successfully completed eight prior formwork jumping operations. But an experienced jobsite manager and leading hand on the crew had been called away to assist elsewhere just before the accident, the executives state.

Acknowledging another shortcoming, Bechtel says the company now will refrain from automatically disciplining staff who violate its Life Critical Rules, including fall protection, but will suspend discipline if the violation is "identified and corrected within the crew." Failing that, violations will be strictly enforced, including possible termination.

Safety and legal professionals were still interpreting Bechtel's report and revelations at the time this story was posted.

Travis Livermore, a Dallas-based attorney at Marshall Presley & Pipal, commends the information release. "Bechtel is integrating stop-work authority into its routine, such that there would be no stigma associated with exercising it, and such that it is exercised, not only in the face of an immediate danger, but also as a safeguard," he says.

Legal Implications

Livermore says in such negotiations an employer may defend itself by saying a fatality was the result of an unpreventable employee action. That works if the employer can show it had established work rules, communicated them, took steps to find violations and enforced the rules. 

Yet other aspects of the Bechtel executives' report amount to a mea culpa. They note, for example, that the crew lacked training for the system used that night.

"All five members of the crew were recent hires who, at the time of hire, had limited or no prior experience in repositioning formwork by jumping," their report states. "While they had completed our general fall protection training and had received on-the-job training and experience jumping formwork during shifts prior to the incident, they had not received the 30-minute classroom training prepared by supervision for the formwork jumping system they were using."

Future high-risk work will be performed during daytime, as much as possible, the Bechtel executives pledge.

Improperly Secured Bracket 

In its investigation, Bechtel concludes that an improperly secured bracket connection between the climbing form system and a concrete tank being constructed led to the accident. The work was part of the estimated $13-billion LNG export terminal project first phase, which is set to have Train 1 operating in 2027 and Train 2 in 2028. Construction of two more trains recently gained final investment decision, with operation set in 2030 and 2031.

"The purpose of sharing our findings is to promote transparency, accountability and learning, helping Bechtel—and the wider industry—anticipate risks and act proactively on safety," say Albert and Marsden.

But their note also contains a disclaimer stating that the report "does not assign legal responsibility or represent final conclusions" that may evolve after more data is in hand or "reports from third parties."